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This paper incorporates search and matching frictions in the labor market into a New Keyne-
sian model. In contrast to the literature, the labor market activity takes place in the (Calvo-
staggered) price-setting sector. Matching frictions lead price-setting ﬁrms to negotiate wage
rates with their employees. The negotiation of wages substantially increases strategic comple-
mentarity in price-setting among suppliers of diﬀerentiated goods. This leads to an increase in
real rigidities as in Woodford (2003), which reduces the size of price changes optimally chosen
by re-optimizing ﬁrms. The same factors which induce smooth inﬂation also dampen the ad-
justment of wages in response to shocks. In the search and matching framework this is key for
explaining the highly responsive nature of vacancies in the data. Another interesting ﬁnding for
the Phillips curve is that inﬂation is not only driven by an output gap but also by an employment
gap – a feature usually neglected in empirical research. The modiﬁed model matches impulse
responses of an SVAR for post Volcker-disinﬂation US data very well.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E31,E24,E32,J63,J64
Keywords: ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor, real rigidities, Phillips curve, wage rigidity, bargaining.
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This paper highlights that the labor market may have a potentially strong eﬀect on the joint
behavior of inﬂation and real wages over the business cycle. In particular, even if wage rates are
reset as frequently as prices are (on average every second quarter in the paper’s calibration for
the US), the resulting real wage series does not respond much to a sudden monetary easing and
to the associated increase in aggregate demand and labor market tightness. The intuition rests
on the assumption that wages are not set independently of the demand situation which the ﬁrm
is facing. Especially if demand is relatively price-elastic, as might reasonably be argued is the
case for many industries in times of increasing globalisation, the model predicts both smooth
wages and smooth inﬂation.
The model is set up in a plain-vanilla New Keynesian environment with search and matching
frictions in the labor market ` a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). These frictions mean that
ﬁrms which seek to recruit may not ﬁnd a suitable worker to instantly ﬁll the vacancy. On the
worker side, these frictions also mean that workers who are unemployed might not immediately
ﬁnd a new job. Since opening vacancies is costly and neither the ﬁrm can easily substitute a
worker for another nor a worker can easily change jobs, a ﬁrm-worker match entails economic
rents. These rents are distributed between the ﬁrm and the worker through wage bargaining.
The model highlights that labor naturally arises as a temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor within a
New Keynesian framework with search and matching frictions in the labor market. The existing
literature assumes that bargaining and hiring occur in a diﬀerent industry than the production
of ﬁnal consumption goods. The setting of the price of these ﬁnal goods is therefore not directly
linked to the bargaining situation within the ﬁrm. As e.g. Krause and Lubik (2005), Trigari
(2006) and Christoﬀel and Linzert (2005) have shown, in such a setting, including the labor mar-
ket into the New Keynesian benchmark model does not have much of an eﬀect on inﬂation inertia
unless one assumes that the wage bargaining deviates from eﬃcient bargaining. Consequently,
this paper merges these two sectors: workers are employed in ﬁrms which directly produce a
diﬀerentiated ﬁnal output good. While this appears to be a minor change, it turns that it has
repercussions on both inﬂation and wage rigidity. Intuitively, with both sectors merged, at the
stage of the wage bargaining both workers and ﬁrms are well aware of the eﬀect which the wage
has for the (marginal) costs of the ﬁrm and therefore for the ﬁrm’s demand conditions.
The mechanism which is at work is the following. Due to the matching frictions, in the short-run
a worker constitutes a ﬁrmspeciﬁc factor of production for the ﬁrm. He is associated with the
ﬁrm, is not himself able to walk away and work at a diﬀerent ﬁrm and, on the other hand, the
ﬁrm also cannot easily replace him. Now consider a worker who contemplates asking for a wage
increase. All else equal an increase in the wage rate for the worker would lead to an increase
in marginal production costs for the ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm is a monopolist for its variety of the
good1, it would immediately pass part of the cost increase on to consumers through an increase
in the product price. So the worker knows that a higher wage demand will lead to a higher
product price. This higher product price, however, would make the variety of the good which
the ﬁrm produces relatively more expensive than that of competitors. Demand would fall. In
turn, the worker will be employed for fewer hours in order to satisfy this demand. Assuming
that workers have an increasing marginal disutility of work, this leads to a fall in the worker’s
1 In technical terms, the ﬁrm operates in monopolistically competitive product markets.
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his work-load has fallen. Any putative increase in the wage demanded by the worker therefore
triggers a counteracting force, reducing a worker’s incentive to ask for a wage increase in the
ﬁrst place. Wages are therefore smoother than in the absence of this channel.
For the argument to go through three ingredients are of importance: a) demand needs to be
relatively price-elastic (so demand drops by enough when wages increase), b) marginal disutility
of work needs to be suﬃciently increasing (so the subjective price of work reacts enough to a
change in the work-load) and c) there need to be matching frictions in the labor market (without
matching frictions, the ﬁrm would simply immediately replace a worker who is asking for a wage
increase by another worker).
Exactly the same mechanism is at work to generate smooth price adjustments.2 The same fac-
tors that drive the real (price) rigidity thus translate into signiﬁcant real wage rigidity. The
current paper therefore contends the irrelevance of the labor market for the inﬂation process
found in the recent labor market literature.
The resulting smooth hourly wage series implied by the model allows to replicate the ﬂuctuation
of vacancies and unemployment found in US data (cp. Hall, 2005, Shimer, 2005). The current
paper illustrates this using a structural VAR analysis with an identiﬁed monetary policy shock.
2 A ﬁrm that would like to increase its price would face a fall in demand. The ensuing fall in the worker’s
shadow price of work would reduce the workers wage demand and thus marginal costs. With marginal costs
fallen the ﬁrm would face less pressure to incresase the price in the ﬁrst place. For prices and in the absence of
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The New Keynesian model can achieve a smooth inﬂation series while preserving the assumption
of reasonable nominal rigidity3 once the model structure induces ﬁrms to voluntarily opt for
small price changes through so called real (price) rigidities, see e.g. Ball and Romer (1990) and
Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). One strand of the literature states that the labor market is at the
heart of understanding the inﬂation process. Here, wage rigidity can be used to induce inﬂation
inertia, see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). A full-ﬂedged labor market and
especially equilibrium unemployment is, however, suspiciously absent from these models. The
other strand of literature adds an explicit labor market with search and matching frictions and
equilibrium unemployment to the New Keynesian model. Astonishingly, this strand of literature
arives at the contrary conclusion: litte real rigidity remains, see e.g. Krause and Lubik (2005)
and Trigari (2006). The current paper contends the irrelevance of the labor market for the
inﬂation process found in the latter strand of literature.
Labor market frictions, on the one hand, can help to account for a smooth inﬂation series
once they induce reasonably smooth aggregate marginal cost. In Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) price-setting ﬁrms hire labor in a perfectly competitive market. Wage rigidity
then achieves smooth marginal cost. The presence of equilibrium unemployment can further
curb aggregate marginal cost as there are slack resources into which ﬁrms can tap once shocks
increase aggregate demand. The literature, however, has found that the eﬀect from adding an
extensive margin of employment is rather limited, see Krause and Lubik (2005) and Trigari
(2006). A diﬀerent mechanism which induces ﬁrms to change prices in small increments works
via strongly responsive marginal cost at the individual ﬁrm level.4 In Woodford (2003, Ch. 3),
e.g., workers are permanently assigned to a speciﬁc ﬁrm which produces a diﬀerentiated good.
A ﬁrm which contemplates increasing its price then anticipates that the ensuing fall in demand
causes a reduction in hours worked. In his framework this triggers a fall in the marginal rate of
substitution of the worker which leads to lower wage demand and consequently lower marginal
cost. This in turn reduces the incentive to increase the price in the ﬁrst place. Woodford needs
to make the assumption that labor is completetely ﬁrm-speciﬁc and worthless outside of the
speciﬁc ﬁrm.5
My paper, in contrast, stresses that labor as a ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor arises naturally within a New
3 US ﬁrms adjust prices on average twice a quarter (see Bils and Klenow, 2004, and Klenow and Kryvtsov,
2005).
4 The potential importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁcity of capital has recently been met by considerable interest; see
Sbordone (2002), Woodford (2003, 2004), Sveen and Weinke (2004), Christiano (2004), Eichenbaum and
Fisher (2004) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005). Another way to reconcile Phillips curve
estimates with micro-evidence is to assume decreasing returns to factors of production, see e.g. Gal´ ı, Gertler,
and L´ opez-Salido (2001), or to assume a non-constant elasticity of demand (a slightly kinked demand curve),
which makes it easier to loose customers by raising a ﬁrm’s price than to gain customers by lowering it,
i.e. the elasticity of demand is falling sharply with a ﬁrm’s market share (hence rising sharply in a ﬁrm’s price)
see Kimball (1995). Similar eﬀects arise when consumption habits are product-speciﬁc. This also leads to
pro-cyclical own price elasticities of demand; see Ravn, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2005).
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all workers are ex-ante homogenous and only diﬀerentiate themselves by being currently (but
not permanently) matched to a speciﬁc ﬁrm (or are unemployed otherwise). The ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factor is thus only ﬁrm-speciﬁc as long as the match is not severed so that there always remains
an outside market value to the worker. Costly search and matching creates a quasi-rent for
existing jobs, which ﬁrm and worker distribute by wage bargaining. I assume, realistically, that
hiring and wage negotation take place within the same ﬁrms which produce diﬀerentiated goods.
The assumption that wage bargaining takes place in the diﬀerentiating industry considerably
improves the New Keynesian model in terms of inﬂation persistence. The current paper thus
highlights that the search and matching model (e.g. Pissarides, 1985) is a natural candidate to
generate real rigidities.
At ﬁrst glance, this assertion runs counter to the results of Trigari (2006) and Krause and Lubik
(2005) who also introduce search and matching mechanism into the New Keynesian model but
with little eﬀect on inﬂation inertia. The reasons for the diﬀering results are as follows: In my
model, there is a direct link from the labor market to price-setting at the individual ﬁrm level. In
Trigari (2006), in contrast, the labor market matters for inﬂation only through aggregate states
like labor market tightness.6 Closer to my framework are Krause and Lubik (2005), who also
assign price setting and vacancy posting decisions to the same sector. For analytical tractability
they assume, however, that marginal disutility of work is constant.7 The current paper, in
contrast, emphasizes that real rigidity arises precisely from the fact that disutility of work is
increasing in work-load. Higher output of a ﬁrm then means higher wage demand by its worker
and thus a curbing eﬀect on price changes.
Another feature diﬀerentiates this paper from the literature: I derive wage rigidity from a
mechanism in the model, and highlight that rigidity mainly arises as a result of strategic behavior
of ﬁrms and workers. The intuition for this is as follows: all else equal an increase in the
negotiated ﬁrm-worker-speciﬁc hourly wage would lead to an increase of marginal cost at the
ﬁrm level and thus to an increase of the product price. With elastic demand for goods the
amount of the good supplied falls. In order to satisfy the now reduced demand, the worker
needs to work less hours. The marginal disutility of work in turn falls which, all else equal,
dampens the worker’s demanded wage per hour.
The resulting smooth hourly wage series implied by the model allows to replicate the ﬂuctuation
of vacancies and unemployment found in US data (cp. Hall, 2005, Shimer, 2005).8 A structural
6 Trigari (2006) assumes that there are two sectors in the economy. In her model, a Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) type labor sector produces an intermediate “labor” input. This is the only input to production of
diﬀerentiated goods. The market for “labor” input is competitive. All that matters for the pricing decision in
the diﬀerentiation sector is thus the price level for“labor”goods and hence aggregate states. This seems to be
the standard approach in the literature, see e.g. Braun (2005).
7 Their model features endogenous separation. The fact that all ﬁrms face the same marginal cost simpliﬁes
their computations considerably.
8 Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) calibrate the model in Hall (2005) to a low bargaining power of workers. This
also induces unresponsive wages. Jung (2005) illustrates that a key assumption is that the utility diﬀerence
between employment and unemployment is small in order to explain the large amplitude of unemployment in
the data. In his framework with capital, however, this does not necessarily require as large a replacement rate
as in Hagedorn and Manovskii.
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(2004) and Hall (2005), who right-away assume real wage rigidity from the outset, the current
paper provides an economic mechanism which translates minor nominal rigidity into substantial
real wage rigidity. It therefore links the real rigidities debate to labor market ﬂuctuations in that
it provides for suﬃcient real wage rigidity to match the degree of vacancy ﬂuctuations observed
in the data.9
An interesting third ﬁnding of the paper (besides the induction of inﬂation and wage inertia) is
that it also has implications for single equation estimates of New Keynesian Phillips curves taken
for themselves. The model implies (a) that future inﬂation in the Phillips curve is more heavily
discounted than by the consumers’ time-discount factor due to the probability of separation of
ﬁrm and worker. The model implies (b) the presence of an “employment gap” as an additional
(and usually omitted) regressor. Output and employment are strongly positively correlated in
the data. If the model posited here is the data-generating process omitting the employment gap
is likely to bias implied price-durations inferred from Phillips curve estimates upwards. In turn
this would imply an upward bias for the implied price duration.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section lays out the model. Section
3 discusses some of the (linearized) equilibrium conditions. Special emphasis is on the implied
reduced form Phillips curve and the wage equation. Section 4 illustrates that the entire model
can replicate the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks taken from a small structural
vector autoregression for post Volcker disinﬂation US data. A ﬁnal section concludes. Some
technical material and a thorough description of the data is deferred to the Appendix.10
2 The Model
According to Hall (2005) cyclical ﬂuctuations in employment are mainly due to ﬂuctuations
in vacancy posting. I therefore assume a constant separation rate. In each period a constant
fraction, δ, of ﬁrm-worker relationships splits up for an exogenous reason. The backbone of the
model discussed here is therefore similar to Trigari (2006). As is common in the literature, I
focus on a cashless limit economy; cp. Smets and Wouters (2003) and large parts of Woodford
(2003).
Inﬂation inertia has been well documented in monetary policy structural vector autoregressions
(SVARs). Section 4 will match the DSGE model’s impulse-responses as closely as possible to the
responses obtained in a monetary SVAR. This exercise is partial in the sense that I abstract from
identifying any aggregate shocks in the economy apart from monetary policy shocks. To ease
9 The mechanism stressed in this paper diﬀers from Gertler and Trigari (2005) who use staggered Calvo wage-
setting in a real-business cycle model. Since in their setup, it is not clear how, if wages are left unchanged,
hours are determined, they have to shut-down the intensive margin completely. In my model, the assumption of
wage and pricing setting being conducted in the same sector, leads hours worked to be (demand-)determined.
Also, Gertler and Trigari (2005) seem to lack the ampliﬁcation mechanism for wage rigidity, which I discussed
above.
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but for a shock to monetary policy.
There are information lags. When making decisions in period t, ﬁrms and workers know ev-
erything pertaining to them individually and all period t − 1 shocks. They do not, however,
know the contemporaneous value of the only aggregate shock, the monetary policy shock. The
timing in the model is as follows: ﬁrms and workers ﬁrst observe whether a match is separated
or not. In the Calvo-staggered framework which I apply, they are, next, informed whether they
can update their price and wage. Based on this information but otherwise only information
available in t − 1, worker and ﬁrm, respectively, take non-state contingent consumption, price-
and wage-setting and vacancy posting decisions for period t. The monetary policy shock mate-
rializes thereafter and the family takes its portfolio (equity) choice with full information. Due
to these information lags on behalf of the private sector, monetary policy innovations have a
contemporaneous bearing only on the monetary policy instrument (the nominal interest rate)
as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), and on the share prices of ﬁrms.
2.1 Consumers
The model economy is populated by a large number of identical, representative, families with
unit mass. Each family has a continuum of members of two types: unemployed workers with
mass ut and employed workers with mass nt = 1 − ut. Each family pools the labor incomes of






t is the real wage per hour worked by member i, hi
t. In addition,
a family obtains income from real unemployment beneﬁts, b, (utb in total). Families also hold
shares in a mutual fund that redistributes proﬁts in the economy. Individual members of the
representative family, indexed by i ∈ [0,1], are inﬁnitely lived and seek to maximize expected
lifetime utility by deciding on the level (and intertemporal distribution) of consumption of a
bundle, ci
t, of consumption goods and by deciding on the real expenditure, di
t, for riskless one-
period bonds. These decisions are taken before the monetary policy shock becomes known. In
the following, endogenous variables pertaining to individual consumers carry superscript index
i. Endogenous variables pertaining to an individual ﬁrm (its product, price or proﬁt) carry

















, β ∈ (0,1),σ > 0. (1)
Here ct−1 is the aggregate level of consumption in period t−1. I assume that an individual family
member’s consumption is subject to external habit persistence, indexed by parameter ̺ ∈ [0,1).
As in Abel (1990) households therefore are concerned with “catching up with the Joneses”.
Family members pool their income – there is thus perfect consumption risk sharing. I assume
that family takes the labor supply decision for its members in order to prevent free-riding.11
11 This assumption and the pooling assumption follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000). Both assumptions
are standard in the literature, see e.g. Braun (2005), Trigari (2006).
10
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t + tt + vtκt. (2)
Here Rt denotes the nominal gross return on the risk-free bond from t to t + 1 and Πt is the
gross inﬂation rate. In period t, a measure of nt one-worker ﬁrms produce goods. nt ∈ (0,1)
thus also is the level of employment in t. Firm j of these makes real proﬁt ψj,t, total proﬁts
accruing to the consumer are
R nt
0 ψj,tdj. The consumer pays lump-sum taxes tt. vt are the
number of vacancies, κt are real costs of posting a vacancy. Vacancy posting costs are assumed
to be lump-sum “tax costs”. They thus enter the consumers’s budget constraint but not the
aggregate ressource constraint.
A total mass of nt varieties yj,t, j ∈ [0,nt], of wholesale goods is produced in a given period.
Let ci
j,t be the amount of each of these goods consumed by family member i. The ﬁnal bundle
of consumption goods consumed by family member i, ci
















where ǫ > 1 denotes the own-price elasticity of demand. By assumption therefore, more product
diversity leads to more output in terms of the consumption basket, i.e. consumers value product
diversity.12 Due to consumption insurance and separability of consumption and leisure in the
utility function, all households in equilibrium will have the same consumption levels of each
good. I therefore suppress index i in the following. The cost-minimizing demand for wholesale









t marks average output of the consumption basket per employed worker, ya
t = 1
ntct. The












The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption versus saving (taken subject to a no-Ponzi condition)
can be summarized by the Euler equation











Et−1 {βsλt+sdt+s} ≤ 0. (7)
12 The results of this paper regarding real price and wage rigidity would equally well be obtained when the ﬁnal
consumption good work homogenous of degree zero in degree of product variety. Only the ﬁnal result of this
paper, that inﬂation in the Phillips curve may be driven also by an employment gap hinges on this assumption.
11
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, φ > 0, κh > 0. (8)
Here κh denotes a scaling parameter for the disutility of work. Importantly for the argument





, is increasing in individual hours worked, hi
t. It
is this fact which leads a worker to seek increasing compensation per hour at the margin. For
a ﬁrm this means that marginal costs increase in the production level which in turn induces
them to adjust prices by less than in the standard New Keynesian model. Also this leads to less
volatile negotiated wages.
2.2 Production
The existing macro-labor market literature assumes that ﬁrms which are free to set their price
face marginal costs which are independent of own decisions; e.g. Krause and Lubik (2005) di-
rectly assume that marginal disutility of work is constant, and Trigari (2006), Braun (2005)
and Christoﬀel, Kuester, and Linzert (2006) assume that labor is used only as an input into
an intermediate good. This in turn is sold to a diﬀerentiating sector in perfectly competitive
markets. The contribution of the current paper is to integrate the labor market activity into the
price setting sector and allow for ﬁrmspeciﬁc marginal costs. This brings about the real rigidity
which induces both rigid prices and wages.
Firms which have a worker produce diﬀerentiated goods which they sell under monopolistic
competition. They are subjected to time-dependent price (and wage) setting impediments ` a la
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).13 Firms and workers, if they are allowed to update, decide jointly
how to split the rents of their employment relationship. Hours worked have a ﬁrst-order eﬀect
on individual utility. In this model, they are demand-driven and thus depend directly on the
ﬁrm’s sales price. I therefore assume that a ﬁrm and a worker not only decide about the nominal
hourly wage rate, Wj,t, but that they simultaneously also agree on the product price, Pj,t. This
is a reasonable assumption in the current framework since the price determines hours worked via
the ﬁrm’s demand function. A simplifying assumption is that wages and prices have the same
duration: whenever a ﬁrm can reset its price it can renegotiate its wage rate and vice versa.14
13 Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) summarize that individual price data obtained from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics reveal that (a) price changes are largely non-synchronized, (b) variation in the magnitude of price
changes contributes much more to the variation in aggregate inﬂation (90+%) than variation in the number
of price changes and (c) the size of absolute price changes is large, over 8%. Overall they conclude that the
Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999) state-dependent pricing model, once calibrated to match the micro-price
data, very much resembles the Calvo-model in so far as pricing behavior is concerned. Modeling pricing as
time-dependent may thus not be an overly stringent assumption.
14 This assumption may not be restrictive: In their benchmark version estimated on aggregate US data, Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) ﬁnd that prices and wages roughly have the same duration, 2.5 and
2.8 quarters, respectively. In a survey, Taylor (1999) argues that wages are typically adjusted once per year.
Based on micro-level data on wages per hour, Gottschalk (2005) concludes similarly. Yet this evidence applies
mainly to base pay. Other wage components like bonuses or perks will adjust much more frequently.
12
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There is an inﬁnite number of potential one-worker ﬁrms. These may post vacancies. Once
having recruited a worker, they produce a diﬀerentiated good and engage in wage bargaining. I
describe each decision in turn.
Vacancy Posting. Firms without a worker have to incur a real vacancy posting cost, κt > 0, in
order to stand a chance of recruiting a worker.15 Vt is the market value of a prototypical ﬁrm that
posts a vacancy in period t. Jt(Pj,t,Wj,t) is the real value of a wholesale ﬁrm in period t that has
a worker, charges Pj,t for its good and pays a nominal wage Wj,t for each hour worked. Due to
nominal rigidities, in each period workers and ﬁrms can renegotiate prices and wages only with
probability 1−ϕ. Otherwise they partially update (but do not reoptimize) their price and wage




t−1, respectively, γp,γw ∈ [0,1]). The partial
updating follows Smets and Wouters (2003). For analytical tractability, I keep the heterogeneity
to a minimum.
Firms which just found a worker, i.e. entered the market, have the same price and wage setting
pattern as existing ﬁrm-worker relationships.16 They can choose their optimal price, P∗
t , and
their optimal wage rate, W∗
t , (both to be deﬁned below) with probability 1 − ϕ. With proba-
bility ϕ, however, they have to set previous period’s average price and wage (suitably indexed).
Intuitively this captures the notion that a share of ﬁrms which just set up their business is
so busy with getting in place their business proper, like setting up a distribution channel or
administrative tasks, they they take the prevailing prices and wages in their neighborhood as a
ﬁrst approximation. Only later on, when time permits, will they engage in re-optimizing their
price and wage. A ﬁrm which posts a vacancy ﬁnds a new employee with probability qt. With
probability δ this new match is severed for an exogenous reason prior to production in t. Firms
which loose their worker cease to exist and are therefore worthless. As of period t, the value of
a ﬁrm which opens a vacancy consequently is given by













Here βt,t+1 := β
λt+1
λt is the equilibrium pricing kernel. Due to information lags, vacancies need
to be posted a period in advance, i.e. on the basis of t − 1 information. There is free entry
into production apart from the sunk vacancy posting cost. This drives the expected value of a
vacancy to zero in equilibrium: Et−1 {Vt} = 0.
15 In priciple, the model allows for ﬂuctuations in real vacancy posting costs, e.g. since there are vacancy adjust-
ment costs as in Braun (2005) or because vacancy costs are posted in nominal terms. The empirical exercise
in Section 4 shows that constant real vacancy posting costs, i.e. κt = κ ∀t, are, however, suﬃcient to ﬁt the
vacancy series.
16 To achieve suﬃcient ﬂuctuation in vacancies, real wages of newly formed matches must be sticky in order to
induce suﬃcient ﬂuctuation in vacancies and unemployment (see Shimer, 2004). This is a by-product achieved
by my formulation. Note that the real rigidities mechanism employed in the current paper features spill-overs
from existing prices and wages to newly set ones. The curbing eﬀect on newly set prices and wages would thus
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February 2007Production. Each ﬁrm has the same constant returns to scale production technology
yj,t = zhj,t. (10)
z marks the economy-wide level of labor productivity.
A ﬁrm in production makes a real proﬁt ψt in period t, which depends on the wage rate paid to








With probability 1 − δ the current match will not be severed at the beginning of next period.
Conditional on“surviving”, with probability ϕ the ﬁrm has to retain its current price and wage.
With probability 1−ϕ, however, it can set the new optimal price-wage pair, P∗
t+1,W∗
t+1. Hence
the value of, say, ﬁrm j of the nt ﬁrms which produce in t is





















Matching. A constant-returns-to-scale matching function links new matches, mt, to unemploy-
ment, ut, and vacancies, vt:
mt = σmuα
t v1−α
t , σm > 0, α ∈ [0,1]. (13)
σm governs the rate at which new matches arrive, the eﬃciency of matching. α governs the rel-
ative weight which the pool of searching workers and ﬁrms, respectively, receive in the matching
process. Labor market tightness from the ﬁrm’s point of view is measured by θt := vt/ut. The
probability that a vacant job will be ﬁlled is qt = mt/vt. The probability that an unemployed
worker ﬁnds employment is st = mt/ut. Workers which coming from unemployment are matched
to a ﬁrm during t do not take up productive work until period t + 1. New matches can also be
separated prior to production. Employment thus evolves according to
nt = (1 − δ)(nt−1 + mt−1). (14)
Unemployment is given by
ut = 1 − nt. (15)
Worker Surplus. As noted earlier, unemployed workers receive real unemployment beneﬁts b.
The worker’s surplus from being in employment, i.e. the increase of family welfare through an
14
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Intuitively, this expression can be split in two parts: An employed worker receives his real wage
bill and suﬀers disutility of work,
g(hj,t)
λt , where λt is the marginal utility of consumption. Next
period the worker remains employed with probability 1 − δ or will be unemployed otherwise
(δ). Based on the family’s and worker’s information when prices and wages are set, the value of
employment to the family, Γt(·), of an employed worker matched to a ﬁrm with price Pj,t and























Note that the value of employment next period again depends on the price-wage stickiness.
Similarly the value of a worker who is unemployed during t is
Ut = b














+ (1 − st + stδ)Et−1 {βt,t+1Ut+1}.
(18)
Bargaining. Firm-worker pairs which are allowed to update their price and wage face the
problem of maximizing expected joint surplus by choosing the sales price and by simultaneously
negotiating the nominal wage rate on the basis of t − 1 information. While wages and prices
may be ﬁxed, hours worked can freely adjust to satisfy demand. I stick to the Nash-bargaining










where η ∈ (0,1) is the worker’s bargaining power.
17 This can be derived from ﬁrst principles by assuming that workers value their labor-market actions in terms
of the contribution these actions give to the utility of the family to which they belong and with which they
pool their income; see Trigari (2006).
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February 2007When bargaining, the ﬁrm and the worker need to take into account the eﬀect which their
decision today continues to have for all periods in which they may have to keep prices and wages
ﬁxed. Let P∗
t and W∗
































where |∗ means that the expression is evaluated at the optimal reset-price, P∗
t , and the reset-
wage, W∗




























The fact that wages and prices are always set at the same time simpliﬁes the derivation of a
linearized version of the model since it keeps heterogeneity among ﬁrms and workers, respectively,
within manageable bounds.
2.3 Government
The model is closed by a standard Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate and by a rule for
Ricardian ﬁscal policy.
2.3.1 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority is assumed to control the nominal one-period risk-free interest rate, Rt.
In the following, hats over variables denote percentage deviations of these variables from steady
state. The empirical literature (see, e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 2000) ﬁnds that simple
linearized Taylor-type rules of the form
b Rt = ρm b Rt−1 + (1 − ρm)γπEtb πa
t+3 + b ǫ
money
t (22)
quantitatively are a good representation of monetary policy. Here ρm ∈ [0,1), γπ > 1 and ǫ
money
t
is an iid monetary shock. The use of speciﬁc inﬂation rate concept diﬀers in these rules. I assume
that the policymaker targets average annual inﬂation, b πa
t+3 := 1
4 (b πt + b πt+1 + b πt+2 + b πt+3). This
speciﬁcation of the rule is chosen on empirical grounds: feedback to average inﬂation helps to
obtain reasonable estimates for the coeﬃcient γπ.18














Here Π is the target for the quarterly gross inﬂation rate in steady state (which equals steady state inﬂation).
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I assume that ﬁscal policy is globally and locally Ricardian. The government does not engage
in any government spending. It redistributes revenue from debt issues and vacancy posting
“taxes” to the private agents via lump-sum transfers (−tt) and unemployment beneﬁts. The




Rt−1 = dt + tt + vtκt. (24)
Since the path of debt is not the focus of the current paper, an arbitrary debt-stabilizing rule
which ensures that the government is passive in the sense of Leeper (1991) can be used to close
the government sector. Without loss of generality, I assume that lump-sum taxes adjust so as
to ensure a balanced budget in each period, dt = 0 for all t.
2.4 Market Clearing




















t = zhj,t. In addition, bonds need to be in zero net supply.
3 Wage and Price Stickiness
The New-Keynesian labor-market literature so far assumes that marginal costs in the price
setting sector are independent of an individual ﬁrm’s production level. Krause and Lubik (2005)
implement this by means of a constant marginal disutility of work of the ﬁrm’s employees.
Trigari (2006) separates wage bargaining from price setting altogether by means of a two-sector
structure. I call her framework the“benchmark”modeling strategy since it is employed in other
studies as well (see e.g. Braun, 2005 and Christoﬀel and Linzert, 2005).
The contribution of the current paper is to bring to the forefront that labor in the bargaining
world is ﬁrm-speciﬁc. In the model the price-setting sector is merged with the wage-bargaining
sector. In addition, workers have an increasing marginal disutility of work. This modiﬁcation
leads to both an increase in price rigidity and an increase in wage rigidity compared to the
standard model. Both price and wage rigidity will be the more pronounced, the more elastic
demand is and the more convex is the disutility of work. The degree of observed real wage
rigidity in my model therefore intensiﬁes when the degree of strategic complementarity in price-
setting increases. This ampliﬁcation mechanism is absent in other bargaining models with sticky
wages, e.g. in Gertler and Trigari (2005). The current section highlights these results by closely
examining the Phillips curve and the wage equation after having linearized around the zero-
inﬂation steady state laid out in Appendix A.
Let b πt be the log deviation of the gross inﬂation rate from its steady state. The Phillips curve
17
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b πt =
γp
1 + γp ˘ β
b πt−1 +
˘ β




1 − ˘ β ϕ







Here ˘ β := β(1 − δ) and mrst is the average marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption of employed workers.
Deﬁne the natural rate of average output under ﬂexible prices as y
a,n
t and the natural marginal
utility of consumption under ﬂexible prices as λn
t . With these deﬁnitions, the term b Λt in Phillips






t − b y
a,n




The marginal utility of consumption, b λt, in turn depends on consumption per capita (employed
plus unemployed workers), b ct. In equilibrium this equals total output, b yt – and not only on
output per employee, b ya
t (compare page 11). This means that once substituting for marginal





φ[b yt − b yn





b yt − b yn
t − ̺
￿
























The Phillips curve has the same structure as in Woodford (2003, p. 187) and Boivin and Giannoni
(2005) except for the employment gap.19 The matching model naturally lends itself to an increase
in the strategic complementarity of price-setting decisions due to temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor.
The plain Calvo-type New Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g. Gal´ ı and Gertler, 1999) is obtained
as a special case of (26) and (28) when φ = 0 and δ = 0. Parameter φ governs the curvature
of the disutility of work, see equation (8). When φ = 0, disutility of work is linear in hours
worked. The marginal disutility of work, as in Krause and Lubik (2005), then is constant and
the ﬁrm’s unit wage costs do not increase in its own production level. Consequently, the strategic
complementarity channel by which wage increases limit the incentives to cut prices is absent if
φ = 0.
Parameter δ stands for the probability that a match is separated prior to production in which
case a ﬁrm ceases to exist. The probability of separation leads ﬁrms to implicitly discount the
future more intensively than consumers owing to the ﬁrms’ lower survival probability.20
19 The presence of the employment gap originates from the assumption that consumers explicitly value product
diversity, cp. equation (3). The remaining ﬁndings of the paper do in no way rest on this assumption.
20 Indeed, estimates of new Keynesian Phillips curves for the US and other economies consistently ﬁnd reduced
form discount factors signiﬁcantly well below standard calibrations (of 0.99 on a quarterly basis, say), see
e.g. Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), Gal´ ı, Gertler, and L´ opez-Salido (2001) and Gagnon and Khan (2005). The
18
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of low Frisch elasticities, and a not too small interest elasticity of demand,
1−̺
σ . In addition, a




1+φǫ is smaller than unity, reﬂecting an increase in strategic complementarity
in price setting relative to the “benchmark model”, exactly as in Woodford (2003, Chapter
3). The degree of strategic complementarity rises as the elasticity of demand increases which
substantially dampens the eﬀect of aggregate shocks on inﬂation. Similar multiplicative factors,
albeit clearly with other parametric forms, are found also in the remaining real rigidities literature
(see e.g. Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004).
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) ﬁnd that, in reduced form, their model with
ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital is observationally equivalent to the same model with perfectly competitive
factor markets. From an econometric point of view, these two models are therefore not iden-
tiﬁable from macro-data alone. An advantage of the setup in the current paper is that the
factors driving the degree of strategic complementarity in price-setting do not only appear in
the Phillips curve but also elsewhere in the model. Most notably the elasticity of demand, ǫ, and
the curvature of the disutility of work, φ, also ﬁgures in the wage equation, and the risk aversion
and habit persistence parameters, σ and ̺, are prominent in the IS equation (the consumption





















a novel feature in this paper is that an “employment gap” enters as an additional explanatory
variable for inﬂation in the Phillips curve. Since output is positively correlated with employment
in the data, according to this model even reduced form estimates of the slope of the Phillips
curve, when they omit the employment gap, may be biased downwards (implying price durations
which are biased upwards).22
In the model, two further optimality conditions are altered relative to the benchmark in Trigari
(2006). Vacancy posting is aﬀected by the gap between the optimal wage and the average wage
rate.23 As emphasized earlier, an increase in strategic complementarity in price-setting has a
bearing on the law of motion for aggregate wages, too. Merging the price-setting and wage
bargaining sectors induces real wage rigidity over and above the nominal rigidity which exists
by assumption.
This contrasts with both Krause and Lubik (2005) and Trigari (2006) ﬁnd that Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) type matching frictions add little real rigidity to the New Keynesian model.
current model provides a reason for this: as the separation rate, δ, increases so does the “excess discounting”.
21 Usually, the elasticity of demand, ǫ is calibrated to be much larger than 5. Woodford (2003) uses a value of
7.6, Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) use a value of 101.
22 Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) ﬁnd that using conventional output gap measures, the slope of the Phillips curve is
negative, implying ϕ > 1, which violates the constraint imposed by theory. Whether the bias by omitting the
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and Lubik. The advantage of my formulation of the model is that it links the real rigidities de-
bate to labor-market ﬂuctuations. The next paragraph higlights the cross-equation restrictions
that arise.
In general, the wage equation looks somewhat inaccessible. Intuition can be gained by restrict-
ing the analysis to the case where the real hourly wage equals the workers’ marginal rate of













b θt + b κt
￿





All the coeﬃcients are strictly positive.25 The qualitative features of wage equation (30) are
similar to the benchmark model: real wages increase in output per worker, b y a
t , and vacancy
posting costs, b κt. Real wages also rise in consumption per capita (i.e. they fall with the marginal
utility of consumption, b λt). Furthermore, real wages increase in market tightness, b θt.
An additional mechanism of the model is that real wages are subject to smoothing. For one
thing real wage smoothing is represented by the positive parameters α2 and α3. The degree
of real wage smoothing, not surprisingly, increases as wages and prices are updated less often:
α2/α1 and α3/α1 increases when the average duration of prices and wages, 1
1−ϕ, rises. At the
same time the inﬂuence of market tightness, vacancy posting, marginal utility of consumption
and production per worker all decrease.
More novel, equation (30) reveals a further cause for wage stickiness: The larger the elasticity
of demand, ǫ, the more does the inﬂuence of market tightness fall, and the less important are
ﬂuctuations in vacancy costs and in output per worker (as the elasticity of demand ǫ increases,
23 The vacancy posting equation can be expressed as




















































b πt+1 − γw
































24 This exercise is meant to build intuition only. Neither do any other relations presented so far depend on the







1−β(1−δ)ϕ, α1 = α2
1+β(1−δ)ϕ(ϕ−s)
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February 2007α4/α1 and 1/α1 fall while all other ratios are not aﬀected). Similarly, an increase of the curvature
of the disutility of work, φ, reduces the inﬂuence of marginal utility (α5/α1 falls) while not
aﬀecting any of the other ratios. The same two parameters which are instrumental in increasing
strategic complementarity in price-setting and thus real rigidity therefore also induce a smooth
wage rate, i.e. curb the response of wages to its aggregate driving forces like market tightness
and aggregate output.
This is the main point of the current paper: when integrating the wage and price-setting into
one and the same sector, real rigidities result which lead to both smooth prices,26 and smooth
wage rates. The same parameters which cause inﬂation to react less to aggregate shocks cause
wage rates to react by less. The smoother wage rate in my model causes aggregate ﬂuctuations
to translate into larger amplitudes of a ﬁrm’s period proﬁts. Fluctuating proﬁts, in turn, mean
ﬂuctuating incentives to post vacancies and thus mean volatile vacancy and unemployment
series; see also Shimer (2004) among others. The next section assesses the ﬁt of this mechanism
econometrically.
4 Evaluating the Model
The inert and mild response of inﬂation has been well documented in a rich literature concerned
with monetary policy structural vector autoregressions (SVARs), see e.g. Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1997), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Amato and Laubach (2003), Boivin
and Giannoni (2005) and Meier and Mueller (2005). These results therefore provide a natural
benchmark against which to frame the assessment. My measure of ﬁt of the model is whether
it can to a reasonable extent match the impulse responses to a monetary policy shock identiﬁed
in a monetary SVAR. This exercise is partial in the sense that I abstract from identifying any
aggregate shocks in the economy apart from monetary policy shocks, b ǫ
money
t . Yet the exercise is
general equilibrium in that it brings the entire model structure to bear on this partial aspect of
the data.
As highlighted in Section 3 in contrast to real rigidities arising from ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital (see
Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde, 2005), in the setup with temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc
labor, the parameters which raise the degree of strategic complementarity in price-setting do
not only feature in the Phillips curve but also in the wage equation. In addition, my setup
also alters the vacancy posting equation relative to, e.g., Trigari (2006). A partial equilibrium
analysis examining only some equations of the model, say the Phillips curve as in Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004), would not be adequate for analyzing the mechanism. The entire model
structure needs to be taken into account even when focussing on just one conditional correlation
in the data.
The identiﬁcation assumption in the VAR is standard and in line with the model presented
above: apart from the interest rate, b Rt, non of the observable variables (output b yt, inﬂation b πt,
total hours worked b ht + b nt, vacancies b vt, the unemployment rate b ut and the real wage rate b wt)
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react to a monetary policy shock in the same quarter.The Estimation Procedure. The econometric methodology consists of selecting the struc-
tural parameters which minimize the distance between the impulse responses of an SVAR to a
monetary policy shock and those implied by the model. Focussing only on a subset of the data’s
properties which has been extensively studied simpliﬁes comparability with the literature and –
to the extent that the small model is unable to explain all the features of the data – robustiﬁes
the analysis. Formally, let b Ψ be the stacked impulse responses obtained from the SVAR and let
Ψ(θ) be the impulse responses of the model evaluated at structural parameter vector θ which
belong to parameter space Θ. The estimator of the structural parameters is
b θ = argmin
θ∈Θ
￿




b Ψ − Ψ(θ)
￿
, (31)
where WT is a diagonal weighting matrix involving the inverse of each impulse response’s vari-
ance on the main diagonal as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The variances are
based on 10,000 bootstrap estimates from the SVAR.
Implementation. I estimate a VAR from 1984q1, which marks the end of the non-borrowed
reserves targeting episode and the Volcker disinﬂation, through 2005q3.27 The time-series I use
are log output per member of the labor force, quarterly inﬂation rates, log total hours worked
per member of the labor force, log vacancies (measured by the helpwanted index) per member of
the labor force, the log unemployment rate, the log real hourly wage rate and the federal funds
rate in quarterly terms.28 I take the civilian labor force of age 16 and over.29 Table 4 in the
Appendix provides the data sources.
Let xt be the vector of observable variables. I estimate the VAR
xt =   + at +
4 X
j=1
Aj xt−j + ut. (32)
Here   is a vector of constants, a is a vector of coeﬃcients, t is a time-trend, Aj are coeﬃcient
matrices and ut is a vector of white noise shocks. The inclusion of the time-trend turned out not
27 The volatility of aggregate real variables has decreased since the early 1980s; Kim and Nelson (1999) locate
the break date in the amplitude of US GDP growth rates and the volatility of shocks to US GDP growth rates
at 1984q1 (their posterior mode). The same break date is found in McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000). Stock
and Watson (2002) document that this evidence is not limited to real GDP growth but can be found in a great
number of US macroeconomic time series. My sample start should safeguard against these structural breaks.
In order not to restrict the sample too much, I include lags prior to 1984q1.
28 The response of output and hours worked is identical in my model yet not in the data. The impulse responses
presented below appeared to be robust to leaving out hours worked.
29 Francis and Ramey (2005) construct a labor force measure which corrects for (low frequency) demographic
movements over the postwar period, which can be features of the civilian labor force 16+ measure. The use
of their labor force series would have reduced the sample by 4 observations. Yet, as the sensitivity analysis
in Appendix C shows, the results would be qualitatively unchanged. The low frequency movements seem to
be more important for responses to technology shocks than for responses to monetary shocks, which are the
focus of my paper. I thank Francis and Ramey for providing me with their labor force series.
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frequency of the data, the lag length in the VAR is set to p = 4. No evidence for residual serial
correlation can be found.
Table 1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Variable 4 quarters 8 quarters 12 quarters
b yt 5.28 [ 0.55, 13.88] 10.20 [1.07, 20.27] 10.47 [1.26, 18.25]
b πt 0.36 [ 0.29, 6.95] 3.97 [1.90, 11.93] 6.06 [2.53, 12.97]
b vt 1.37 [ 0.16, 7.57] 10.71 [1.02, 20.40] 9.76 [1.10, 16.85]
b ut 0.87 [ 0.19, 6.60] 9.86 [1.13, 21.56] 13.94 [1.39, 21.83]
b ht+
b nt 0.53 [ 0.15, 5.98] 4.24 [0.51, 13.47] 6.14 [0.69, 13.70]
b wt 1.59 [ 0.19, 8.21] 0.95 [0.56, 10.89] 1.31 [0.55, 14.64]
b Rt 26.15 [11.50, 36.69] 15.53 [7.21, 28.47] 18.07 [7.02, 28.17]
Notes: For each variable in the ﬁrst column and three diﬀerent forecast horizons,
the table reports the share of the forecast error variance which is accounted for
by the identiﬁed monetary policy shock. The values in parentheses are lower
and upper bounds of 90% conﬁdence intervals obtained from 10,000 bootstraps
of the estimated SVAR. From top to bottom the variables are output, inﬂation,
vacancies, the unemployment rate, total hours worked per capita (member of the
labor force), the real wage rate and the nominal interest rate. The data used is as
described in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Table 1 shows forecast error variance decompositions. For each variable featuring in the VAR
each entry gives the percentage of forecast error variance that is attributable to the identiﬁed
monetary policy shock. As can be inferred, the monetary policy shock accounts for a sizeable
share of the ﬂuctuation in these variables.
The model is calibrated to match independent evidence in the literature; see Table 2. Labor
supply is not very elastic, φ = 10 as in Trigari (2006). The value of σ = 0.1 is lower than
the degree of risk aversion conventionally used. It is, however, close to the value of Boivin and
Giannoni (2005). The current model equates a theoretical concept, non-durable consumption,
with data on GDP. It therefore does not take into account other much more interest sensitive
categories of consumption and GDP (like durable consumption and investment spending). A
low σ corrects for this omission. See also the discussion on page 21. The calibration for the
labor market is standard. The replacement rate, b
wh is meant to include the value of home
production similar to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005). A key feature of my paper is that I
assume price-setting frictions in line with microevidence (see Bils and Klenow, 2004): prices are
reset on average twice a year, ϕ = 0.5. The weak response of inﬂation to a monetary shock is
therefore left to be explained by real rigidities.
Only a small subset of parameters will be estimated: the smoothing coeﬃcient ρm and the
response to inﬂation γπ, the degree of habit persistence ̺, the elasticity of demand ǫ, wage in-
dexation γw and worker bargaining power η as well as the weight of unemployment in matching
α. I restrict the estimation to determinate equilibria.
Impulse Responses. Figure 1 compares the impulse reponses of the estimated DSGE model
(red and dotted) to the impulse responses obtained from the SVAR (black and solid). Shaded
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Parameter Description Value Source
Preferences
φ inverse of labor supply elasticity 10.0 Evidence collected in Card (1994);
also used by Trigari (2006).
β time-discount factor 0.99 ∼ average real rate of 4% p.a. in the data.
σ degree of risk aversion 0.10 close to estimate in Boivin and Giannoni (2005).
Labor Market
δ separation rate 0.08 Hall (1999), Trigari (2006).
u steady state unemployment rate 0.10 matches employment rate of 94%
∗).
q steady state vacancy ﬁlling rate 0.70 den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
b
wh steady state replacement rate 0.90 similar to Braun (2005),
(including home-production) Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005).
Price and Wage Setting
γp inﬂation indexation of prices 1.00 Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
ϕ price stickiness 0.50 Bils and Klenow (2004).
Notes:
∗) The employment rate of 94% in the data translates into an unemployment rate of 6% when inter-
preted as representing post-separation employment or 13.5% when interpreted as pre-separation employment.
The unemployment rate of 10% in above calibration ranges in between these two bounds. The value of u is
large in comparison with the oﬃcial unemployment rate. In the model, however, u is the pool of searching
workers and should encompass workers who are not included in the oﬃcial unemployment rate but searching
for work (e.g., discouraged workers). For a thorough discussion see Yashiv (2006).
areas are 90% conﬁdence intervals.
The model ﬁts the data along the examined dimensions very well, in line with the results
presented by Trigari (2004) and Braun (2005). The response of output to a monetary policy
shock is hump-shaped and persistent. The strategic complementarity term in the Phillips curve
(26) is estimated to be substantially smaller than unity:
φ+ σ
1−̺
1+φǫ ˆ =0.06. Even though prices are
adjusted frequently, inﬂation thus shows a mild but lasting response to the monetary policy
shock. Both vacancies and the unemployment rate show a strong reaction to the shock. Vacancy
rates increase by over 20% and the unemployment rate shows a similar fall in the data.30
The DSGE model by and large matches the timing of the peak responses as well as the magnitude
of the responses. Most notably, vacancies show strong persistence in response to a monetary
policy shock even without introducing vacancy adjustment costs as in Braun (2005) or convex
hiring costs as in Yashiv (2006), and in contrast to the results using productivity shocks in Fujita
and Ramey (2005).31 In my model, with probability ϕ ﬁrms entering production for the ﬁrst
30 To be very clear: the unemployment rate falls by roughly 20 percent not by 20 percentage points. Using the
10% steady state unemployment rate in my calibration, this means that the unemployment rate falls to 8% in
response to a monetary policy shock – which would still qualify as a “sizeable” response.
31 Fujita and Ramey (2005) argue that the real business cycle matching model lacks persistence in response to
a technology shock. They add a job creation cost (a ﬁxed cost payable once which is not the same for each
job) as opposed to a vacancy posting cost (a cost payable each period the vacancy is open) to their model. In
each period then there is only a limited number of proﬁtable job opportunities for new entrants to the vacancy
pool. Once a job is created, posting a vacancy is costless. This makes vacancies a state variable. Since shocks
are persistent there will be new proﬁtable job opportunities in the next period. Thus vacancies continue to
build up, leading to a more sluggish (and hump-shaped) adjustment.
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February 2007Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Estimated SVAR and DSGE Model
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Notes: The plots show impulse responses to a unit monetary policy shock. All variables are plotted in percentage
deviation from their respective steady state values. The solid black line corresponds to the empirical impulse
response estimated in a VAR(4) from 1984q1 to 2005q3 (including lags up to 1983q1). The red dotted line marks
the impulse response from the estimated DSGE model. Shaded areas pertain to 90% bootstrapped symmetric
conﬁdence intervals from 10,000 draws (computed as ±1.645 the bootstrapped standard deviation). From top
left to bottom right the graphs show the responses of: output, the inﬂation rate, vacancies, the unemployment
rate, total hours worked, the real wage rate and the gross nominal interest rate. The bottom right plot reports
the implied response of total wages. This last response was not used in the estimation exercise but is reported
for completeness. The data used is as described in Table 6 in the Appendix.
time have to set previous period’s nominal wage which is only partially indexed to inﬂation. In
a boom, for some of the new entrants this mechanism curbs the response of wage costs. A larger
share of period proﬁts ﬂows to ﬁrms inducing more ﬁrms to enter in the ﬁrst place. Partial wage
indexation causes these incentives to persist over time and thus goes a long way in inducing the
correct response of vacancies.32 Similarly, the interest rate response is well-matched.
The recent labor market literature, e.g. Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005), points to the fact that
wages tend to correlate only weakly with the business cycle. In so far as monetary policy shocks
as a business cycle driving force are concerned, this ﬁnding is corroborated by the wage rate panel
in Figure 1: the response of the real wage rate, b wt, to a monetary policy shock is insigniﬁcant
across the board – and the wage response is small; similar to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) and Amato and Laubach (2003).
The mild response of real wage rates to monetary policy shocks found in these two papers,
however, is not as robust as responses by the other variables. On a similar sample as Amato
and Laubach (2003), for example Giannoni and Woodford (2005) obtain that the percentage
32 When estimating both wage indexation γw and a quadratic adjustment cost for vacancies, both estimates were
insigniﬁcant – and the ﬁt of the model did not improve.
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to Amato and Laubach (2003) whose real wage response is yet another order of magnitude
smaller than the response which I ﬁnd. My estimates therefore are bracketed by the results in
the literature. Appendix C reports impulse responses and implied structural model parameters
for SVARs estimated on alternative data sets.33
While the response of the real wage rate is subject to some uncertainty when changing the
measure used for the hourly wage rate, the good news is that the response by aggregate (total)
wages, b wt+b ht+b nt, and the other aggregates is not at stake. The model marvellously reproduces
the response of implied total wages to a monetary policy shock for all data sets. The responses
do not inherit the sensitivity surrounding the choice of measure for the real wage rate; see the
bottom right panel in Figure 1 and the same panels in the ﬁgures reported in the sensitivity
analysis (Appendix C).
Parameter Estimates. The main point of the current paper is to show that when integrating
wage and price-setting setting into one and the same sector, real rigidities result which lead to
both smooth prices and smooth wage rates. This is corroborated by the impulse responses in
Figure 1. The model manages to reproduce both the small reaction of inﬂation and of wage rates
to a monetary shock. Section 3 highlighted from a theoretical angle that the same parameters
which cause inﬂation to react less to aggregate shocks, most notably the curvature of disutility of
work ϕ and the elasticity of demand ǫ, cause wage rates to react by less. The smooth wage rate
in my model causes aggregate ﬂuctuations to translate into ﬂuctuations of a ﬁrm’s period proﬁts.
Fluctuating proﬁts, in turn, mean ﬂuctuating vacancies and thus mean a volatile vacancy series,
as desired and evident in Figure 1.
Turning to the estimates b θ of the structural parameters underlying the impulse responses, Table
3 conﬁrms that these estimates are in line with other studies. The literature allows for a sizeable
range of the own-price elasticity of demand, ǫ, which is an instrumental parameter for inducing
real rigidity in my model. Only if demand is suﬃciently elastic, marginal production costs react
enough to curb the incentive for price changes. Values proposed in the literature run from ǫ = 6
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), to a value of 11 (e.g. Boivin and Giannoni, 2005),
to an own-price elasticity of ǫ = 101 in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005).34
The estimate of ǫ = 22.8 in my model is reasonable and lies in the range of values just listed.
Due to both, the implied small markup of roughly 4.6% and non-negligible bargaining power of
workers, η = 0.21, overall estimated period proﬁts are small: period proﬁts of ﬁrms matched
with a worker in steady state are in the order of only 0.6% of period production. Aggregate
proﬁts are estimated to be low, in line with Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
33 Three additional SVARs are considered (labeled Case 2 through 4 in Table 7). Case 2 is the same as the
benchmark SVAR but discounts wage rates by the GDP deﬂator instead of the consumer price index. Case
3 uses a diﬀerent wage series (wage and salary disbursements private industry divided by total hours worked
in the business sector) than the benchmark SVAR (which uses an index of average hourly earnings for private
industries). Case 4 obtains per capita measures by use of the Francis and Ramey (2005) measure of the labor
force. Conﬁdence bands for the real wage rate response remain wide but depending on the data used wage
rates may show a stronger response than in my benchmark data set.
34 In the papers just mentioned, these values imply a markup of 20%, 10% and 1% over marginal cost, respectively.
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Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error 90% bounds
ρm interest-rate smoothing 0.83 (0.060) [0.68 , 0.92]
γπ response to expected inﬂation 1.51 (0.542) [1.01
∗) 6.83]
̺ degree of habit persistence 0.97 (0.007) [0.94 , 1.00]
ǫ own-price elasticity of demand 22.8 (9.935) [6.29 , 33.44]
γw indexation wages 0.49 (0.165) [0.00 , 0.93]
η bargaining power of workers 0.21 (0.112) [0.01 , 0.82]
α elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment 0.52 (0.083) [0.46 , 1.00]
Notes: The standard error number is the asymptotic standard error. Standard errors are based on
asymptotic covariance formulae for extremum estimators. For details see Meier and Mueller (2005).
The ﬁnal column shows 5% lower and 95% upper bounds for parameter estimates obtained from 10,000
bootstraps. The data used is as described in Table 6 in the Appendix.
∗) the lower bound for γπ in the estimation was set to 1.01.
Turning to the remaining parameters, the degree of interest rate smoothing, ρm = 0.83, and the
interest response to inﬂation, γπ = 1.51, are in the standard range of values commonly estimated
for Taylor-type rules, see e.g. Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000).
The estimate of the degree of habit persistence, ̺ = 0.97, is larger than the value of 0.65 es-
timated in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and that of 0.7 in Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005), while the calibrated value of σ = 0.1 is substantially smaller
than the value of unity usually assumed for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption. The estimate is, however, by and large in line with Boivin and Giannoni (2005).35
One simpliﬁcation that the current model shares with theirs is that I consider all expenditure
(including investment) as if it were non-durable consumption. Models that account separately
for investment and consumption dynamics usually assume investment adjustment costs, see
e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The “habit persistence”, ̺, estimated here can
therefore be understood as a mixture of adjustment costs in investment expenditure and true
habits in private consumption. Similarly, parameter σ reﬂects the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in investment spending as much as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption. See the discussions in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) and Boivin and Giannoni (2005).36
Turning to the labor market parameters, micro-level estimates for the worker bargaining power,
η, are hard to come by. On US macro-data Trigari (2004) estimates η = 0.10, while Braun (2005)
obtains η = 0.77. My estimate of η = 0.21 is in this range. Finally, for the elasticity of matching
with respect to unemployment, α, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the literature to ﬁnd
that most micro-data based estimates for the matching elasticity fall in the range from 0.5 to
0.7, and so does my estimate of α = 0.52.
35 Their sample ranges from 1979q3 to 2002q2. The estimates in Boivin and Giannoni (2005) in a similarly
“small” model as mine are σ = 0.08 and ̺ = 0.91.
36 Woodford (2003, Ch. 5) shows that a ﬁxed-capital model and the more general model featuring adjustment
costs for investment can be calibrated so as to generate almost identical and empirically credible impulse
responses of inﬂation, output, interest rates and real marginal costs to a monetary shock.
27
ECB 
Working Paper Series No 720
February 2007Sampling Uncertainty of Parameters. The standard errors reported in Table 3 are based
on the asymptotic normality of minimum-distance estimators. Complementary evidence on the
ﬁnite-sample distribution of the estimators can be obtained by bootstrapping. For each set of
impulse-responses obtained in the 10,000 bootstraps of the SVAR the model parameters are
re-estimated. Figure 2 shows histograms of the resulting sampling distribution of the param-
eters and the ﬁnal column of Table 3 reports 90% conﬁdence intervals based on the sampling
distribution, so proper account is taken of the sampling errors that result at each stage of the
estimation.
For about 9% of the estimates for the monetary policy feedback to inﬂation, γπ, the imposed
lower bound of 1.01 is binding. Most notable are the implications for wage indexation and the
bargaining power of workers. More than 40% of the estimates for wage indexation, γw, end
up at the lower bound of zero – wage indexation does not seem to be a robust feature of my
data set and model, in contrast to the case made Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).37
Finally the bargaining power of workers, η has a mode closer to zero than the point estimate in
the benchmark SVAR suggests. Yet overall, and abstracting from the asymmetry of some of the
sampling distributions, the standard errors reported in Table 3 give reasonable guidance to the
uncertainty surrounding the point estimates in the benchmark SVAR.
37 It goes without saying that they have a structurally diﬀerent model and use a diﬀerent sample).
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Notes: The plots show histograms of the sampling distribution of the estimated parameters. On the set
of impulse responses obtained in the 10,000 bootstraps underlying the grey areas of Figure 1 problem
(31) is solved. The distribution of estimators
b θ is plotted on the support of the respective parameters
allowed for in the estimation. Exceptions are the plots for ρm,γπ, and ̺, which focus on only part of the
support for better readability. The estimation of γπ ﬁxed the upper bound at 60. 7.8% of the estimates
were larger than the highest value of 5 plotted here. The estimation of ρm allowed for a support between
zero and one. No estimate was smaller than the lowest value reported in the plot. Similarly ̺ was
estimated on [0,1) but no value was smaller than the lowest value reported. The vertical dashed red line
in each graph marks the point estimate obtained from the SVAR run on the actual data (cp. Table 3).
From top left to bottom right the graphs show the distribution of estimates of the interest rate response
to lagged interest rates and inﬂation, ρm and γπ respectively, of habit persistence, ̺, the elasticity of
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This paper has illustrated that with equilibrium unemployment and matching frictions, strategic
complementarities in price-setting naturally arise due to a temporarily ﬁrm-speciﬁc factor of
production: labor. The matching framework thus induces a signiﬁcant amount of real rigidity
as is needed to reconcile macro-estimates of Calvo-type Phillips curves with microevidence. I
conclude that leaving out the labor market from New Keynesian models is not necessarily an
innocent assumption.
The most important result of this paper, however, is that the strategic complementarities in
price-setting do not only induce smooth inﬂation. Even if wage rates are reset as frequently as
prices are (on average every second quarter in my calibration), the resulting real wage series
does not respond much to a sudden monetary easing and to the associated increase in aggregate
demand and labor market tightness. The intuition rests on the assumption that wages are
not set independently of the demand situation which the ﬁrm is facing. Especially if demand
is relatively elastic, as may reasonably be argued is the case for many industries in times of
increasing globalisation, the model predicts that both wages and inﬂation are smooth at the same
time and for the same reasons. For the sake of the argument consider a worker contemplating to
ask for a wage increase. All else equal an increase in the wage rate would lead to an increase in
marginal production costs for the employer. Consequently the employer would pass part of the
cost increase on to consumers by increasing the product price. This would cause a fall in demand
and thus in hours worked per employee, which would lead to a smaller marginal disutility of
work of the employee. This fall in the subjective price of work in turn would counteract the
worker’s incentive to ask for a wage increase in the ﬁrst place. The same factors that drive the
real (price) rigidity thus translate into signiﬁcant real wage rigidity.
The smooth wage series thus implied helps to replicate the large ﬂuctuations of vacancies found
in US data, which have been the focus of much recent debate; see, for instance, Shimer (2004),
Hall (2005), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2005) and Jung (2005). The paper has illustrated this
fact in a structural VAR analysis. The modiﬁed model succeeds in replicating impulse responses
to monetary shocks in post Volcker-disinﬂation US data even with price rigidity in line with
micro-evidence.
The technical contribution of the paper was to directly integrate the wage bargaining into a sector
which has a margin for price-setting but to retain ex-ante worker homogeneity. The modiﬁed
model implies cross-equation restrictions for the key parameters governing real rigidity. It can
thus be used to identify these parameters from macro-data in contrast to some of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital literature.
Throughout the analysis I have assumed that wages and prices are staggered ´ a la Calvo and
have the same durations, i.e. in each individual ﬁrm prices are reset whenever wages are and
vice versa. In this respect one could explore to which extent the price and wage setting decisions
can be uncoupled in a way that still keeps heterogeneity tractable.
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The following sixteen equations (33) to (48) jointly characterize the steady state of the model.
A.1 Household conditions





Marginal utility of consumption:
λ = (1 − ̺)−σy−σ. (34)









1 − β(1 − δ)(1 − s)
. (36)
A.2 Firm conditions
Value of the ﬁrm: by equation (12)
J =
ya − wh
1 − β(1 − δ)
. (37)





Wage FOC: by equation (21), using the steady state expressions for the partial derivatives
involved,
ηJ = (1 − η)∆. (39)







Number of employees: by equation (14)
δn = (1 − δ)m. (41)
Number of unemployed: by equation (15)
u = 1 − n. (42)
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m = σm uαv1−α. (43)










A.4 Goods market clearing
Average production:
ya = zh. (46)
Final good supply: by equation (25)
y = nzh. (47)
Final good demand:
c = y. (48)
A.5 Calibration
The model has four free parameters: the disutility of work scaling factor, κh, vacancy posting
costs, κ, the eﬃciency of matching, σm, and the unemployment beneﬁt (including the value
of home production), b. I normalize z to unity and ﬁx a steady state unemployment rate as
described in Table 2. I set a value of 1/3 for hours worked as well as the probability of ﬁnding
a worker, q, and the replacement rate, b
wh, as both described in Table 2. Using the other
parameters in Tables 2 and 3 this implicitly deﬁnes the free parameters and the steady state
values of all endogenous variables.
B Source of Data
All data are taken from the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis database FRED except for the
adjusted labor force series by Francis and Ramey (2005), which was supplied by these authors
and is given mnemonic LABFFR below, and wage and salary disbursements (private industry),
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Mnemonic Data description
Vacancies HELPWANT Index of Help-Wanted Advertising
base year 1987=100, seasonally adjusted
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Interest rate FEDFUNDS Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate
monthly average, % p.a.
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Nominal wage rate AHETPI Average Hourly Earnings: Total Private Industries
monthly, seasonally adjusted, dollars per hour
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Labor Force CLF16OV Civilian Labor Force, 16 years and over
monthly, seasonally adjusted, thousands
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Total hours worked HOABS Business Sector: Hours of all Persons
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 1992=100.
Unemployment rate UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
monthly, seasonally adjusted,
quarterly average of monthly ﬁgures (own aggregation).
Real output GDPC96 Real Gross Domestic Product
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rates
billions of chained 2000 dollars.
GDP deﬂator GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 2000=100.
Consumer price index PCECTPI Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-Type Price Index
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 2000=100.
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Mnemonic Data description
GDP deﬂator GDPDEF Gross Domestic Product: Implicit Price Deﬂator
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
Index 2000=100.
Wage and salary disbursements A132RC1 Wage and Salary Disbursements Private Industry
quarterly, seasonally adjusted,
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Adjusted labor force series LABFFR Adjusted labor force series
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
Francis and Ramey (2005), provided by the authors.
Real compensation per hour RCPHBS Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 1992=100.
Price deﬂator business sector IPDBS Business Sector: Implicit Price Deﬂator
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 1992=100.
Real output business sector OUTBS Business Sector: Output
quarterly, seasonally adjusted
index 1992=100.
Notes: See table 4.
Table 6: Data Used in the Benchmark Analysis
Variable Formula
Output per capita = log(GDPC96t/CLF16OVt)
Total hours worked per capita = log(HOABSt/CLF16OVt)
Real wage per hour = log(AHETPIt/PCECTPIt)
Quarterly federal funds rate = log(1 + FEDFUNDSt/400)
Quarterly inﬂation rate = dlog(PCECTPIt)
Unemployment rate = log(UNRATEt/100)
Vacancy per capita = log(HELPWANTt/CLF16OVt)
Notes: Mnemonics in the formulae refer to the deﬁnitions in Table 4.
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Variable Formula
Case 2
Output per capita = log(GDPC96t/CLF16OVt)
Total hours worked per capita = log(HOABSt/CLF16OVt)
Real wage per hour = log(AHETPI.t/GDPDEFt)
Quarterly federal funds rate = log(1 + FEDFUNDSt/400)
Quarterly inﬂation rate = dlog(PCECTPIt)
Unemployment rate = log(UNRATEt/100)
Vacancy per capita = log(HELPWANTt/CLF16OVt)
Case 3
Output per capita = log(GDPC96t/CLF16OVt)
Total hours worked per capita = log(HOABSt/CLF16OVt)
Real wage per hour = log(A132RC1t/PCECTPIt/HOABSt)
Quarterly federal funds rate = log(1 + FEDFUNDSt/400)
Quarterly inﬂation rate = dlog(PCECTPIt)
Unemployment rate = log(UNRATEt/100)
Vacancy per capita = log(HELPWANTt/CLF16OVt)
Case 4
Output per capita = log(OUTBSt/LABFFRt)
Total hours worked per capita = log(HOABSt/LABFFRt)
Real wage per hour = log(RCPHBSt ∗ IPDBSt/PCECTPIt)
Quarterly federal funds rate = log(1 + FEDFUNDSt/400)
Quarterly inﬂation rate = dlog(PCECTPIt)
Unemployment rate = log(UNRATEt/100)
Vacancy per capita = log(HELPWANTt/LABFFRt)
Notes: Mnemonics in the formulae refer to the deﬁnitions in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates Sensitivity Case 2
Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error
ρm interest-rate smoothing 0.82 (0.059)
γπ response to expected inﬂation 1.35 (0.414)
hc degree of habit persistence 0.97 (0.008)
ǫ own-price elasticity of demand 22.8 (9.197)
γw indexation wages 0.53 (0.146)
η bargaining power of workers 0.23 (0.117)
α elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment 0.50 (0.082)
Notes: Parameter Estimates. The weighting matrix is obtained by 1,000 bootstraps
from the estimated SVAR. The numbers reported for standard errors are the asymp-
totic standard errors. Standard errors are based on asymptotic covariance formulae for
extremum estimators. For details see Meier and Mueller (2005). The data used is as
described in Table 7.
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Notes: The plots show impulse responses to a unit monetary policy shock. All variables are in percentage
deviation from their respective steady state values. The solid black line corresponds to the empirical impulse
response estimated in a VAR(4) from 1984q1 to 2005q3 (including lags up to 1983q1). The red dotted line marks
the impulse response from the estimated DSGE model. Shaded areas pertain to 90% bootstrapped symmetric
conﬁdence intervals from 1,000 draws (computed as ±1.645 the bootstrapped standard deviation). From top
left to bottom right the graphs show the responses of: output gap, inﬂation rate, vacancies, unemployment
rate, total hours worked, real wage rate and gross nominal interest rate. The bottom right plot reports the
implied response of total wages which was not used in the estimation exercise but is reported for completeness.
The data used is as described in Table 7.
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Table 9: Parameter Estimates Sensitivity Case 3
Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error
ρm interest-rate smoothing 0.81 (0.060)
γπ response to expected inﬂation 1.29 (0.354)
hc degree of habit persistence 0.97 (0.009)
ǫ own-price elasticity of demand 20.7 (8.422)
γw indexation wages 0.59 (0.152)
η bargaining power of workers 0.34 (0.177)
α elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment 0.53 (0.074)
Notes: Parameter Estimates. The weighting matrix is obtained by 1,000 bootstraps
from the estimated SVAR. The numbers reported for standard errors are the asymp-
totic standard errors. Standard errors are based on asymptotic covariance formulae for
extremum estimators. For details see Meier and Mueller (2005). The data used is as
described in Table 7.
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Notes: The plots show impulse responses to a unit monetary policy shock. All variables are in percentage
deviation from their respective steady state values. The solid black line corresponds to the empirical impulse
response estimated in a VAR(4) from 1984q1 to 2005q3 (including lags up to 1983q1). The red dotted line marks
the impulse response from the estimated DSGE model. Shaded areas pertain to 90% bootstrapped symmetric
conﬁdence intervals from 1,000 draws (computed as ±1.645 the bootstrapped standard deviation). From top
left to bottom right the graphs show the responses of: output gap, inﬂation rate, vacancies, unemployment rate,
total hours worked, real wage rate and gross nominal interest rate. The bottom right plot reports the implied
response of total wages which was not used in the estimation exercise but is reported for completeness. The
data used is as described in Table 7.
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Table 10: Parameter Estimates Sensitivity Case 4
Parameter Description Estimate Standard Error
ρm interest-rate smoothing 0.82 (0.071)
γπ response to expected inﬂation 1.83 (0.884)
hc degree of habit persistence 0.96 (0.012)
ǫ own-price elasticity of demand 22.2 (10.454)
γw indexation wages 0.45 (0.214)
η bargaining power of workers 0.34 (0.182)
α elasticity of matches w.r.t. unemployment 0.48 (0.069)
Notes: Parameter Estimates. The weighting matrix is obtained by 1,000 bootstraps
from the estimated SVAR. The numbers reported for standard errors are the asymp-
totic standard errors. Standard errors are based on asymptotic covariance formulae for
extremum estimators. For details see Meier and Mueller (2005). The data used is as
described in Table 7.
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Notes: The plots show impulse responses to a unit monetary policy shock. All variables are in percentage
deviation from their respective steady state values. The solid black line corresponds to the empirical impulse
response estimated in a VAR(4) from 1984q1 to 2004q3 (including lags up to 1983q1). The red dotted line marks
the impulse response from the estimated DSGE model. Shaded areas pertain to 90% bootstrapped symmetric
conﬁdence intervals from 1,000 draws (computed as ±1.645 the bootstrapped standard deviation). From top
left to bottom right the graphs show the responses of: output gap, inﬂation rate, vacancies, unemployment rate,
total hours worked, real wage rate and gross nominal interest rate. The bottom right plot reports the implied
response of total wages which was not used in the estimation exercise but is reported for completeness. The
data used is as described in Table 7.
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